Would a Katana run after an electromagnetic pulse attack?
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your ignition is controlled by electronics (cdi and pickups) ....
i wouldn't wanna take the risk and generate an E.M.P to test it....
on the other hand i wouldn't be off the road, still got my old Bonneville to fall back on if it happenedit ain't broke ....
i ain't fixed it enough
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if the kat is running or turned on it will be.. emp kill powered electronics..
but what makes you ask?2001 Kawasaki zx1100
2000 Kat 750, in 600 Yellow. (GONE but not forgotten)
Bike pics link: http://s422.photobucket.com/albums/pp310/smitty600/
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The most effective defence against electromagnetic bombs is to prevent their delivery by destroying the launch platform or delivery vehicle, as is the case with nuclear weapons. This however may not always be possible, and therefore systems which can be expected to suffer exposure to the electromagnetic weapons effects must be electromagnetically hardened.
The most effective method is to wholly contain the equipment in an electrically conductive enclosure, termed a Faraday cage, which prevents the electromagnetic field from gaining access to the protected equipment. However, most such equipment must communicate with and be fed with power from the outside world, and this can provide entry points via which electrical transients may enter the enclosure and effect damage. While optical fibres address this requirement for transferring data in and out, electrical power feeds remain an ongoing vulnerability.
Where an electrically conductive channel must enter the enclosure, electromagnetic arresting devices must be fitted. A range of devices exist, however care must be taken in determining their parameters to ensure that they can deal with the rise time and strength of electrical transients produced by electromagnetic devices. Reports from the US indicate that hardening measures attuned to the behaviour of nuclear EMP bombs do not perform well when dealing with some conventional microwave electromagnetic device designs.
It is significant that hardening of systems must be carried out at a system level, as electromagnetic damage to any single element of a complex system could inhibit the function of the whole system. Hardening new build equipment and systems will add a substantial cost burden. Older equipment and systems may be impossible to harden properly and may require complete replacement. In simple terms, hardening by design is significantly easier than attempting to harden existing equipment.
An interesting aspect of electrical damage to targets is the possibility of wounding semiconductor devices thereby causing equipment to suffer repetitive intermittent faults rather than complete failures. Such faults would tie down considerable maintenance resources while also diminishing the confidence of the operators in the equipment's reliability. Intermittent faults may not be possible to repair economically, thereby causing equipment in this state to be removed from service permanently, with considerable loss in maintenance hours during damage diagnosis. This factor must also be considered when assessing the hardness of equipment against electromagnetic attack, as partial or incomplete hardening may in this fashion cause more difficulties than it would solve. Indeed, shielding which is incomplete may resonate when excited by radiation and thus contribute to damage inflicted upon the equipment contained within it.
Other than hardening against attack, facilities which are concealed should not radiate readily detectable emissions. Where radio frequency communications must be used, low probability of intercept (ie spread spectrum) techniques should be employed exclusively to preclude the use of site emissions for electromagnetic targeting purposes. Appropriate suppression of UE is also mandatory. Communications networks for voice, data and services should employ topologies with sufficient redundancy and failover mechanisms to allow operation with multiple nodes and links inoperative. This will deny a user of electromagnetic bombs the option of disabling large portions if not the whole of the network by taking down one or more key nodes or links with a single or small number of attacks.
and that's just the begining lol..I wear my tinfoil hat too LOL
So line your garage with lead and have it run into a ground like a lightning rod
is the cheapest form of EMP securityLast edited by Dingo; 04-16-2008, 06:40 PM.
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I have seen a lot of questions, but this one is interesting. Why do you want to know?
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Originally posted by smitty600 View Postif the kat is running or turned on it will be.. emp kill powered electronics..
but what makes you ask?
Plus I unhooked the throttle position sensor once and it seemed to run fine, but I don't know what the TPS really does.
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yeah, normally it would be a wierd question...but with the possibilty of another
attack from terroists is very likely. I have often wondered the same thing.
Will I be able to fly a plane after such an attack, etc...I think it's nuts too
but I have a plan if the Sh*t hits the fan.. which is get my family safe..if not possible
then do my best to survive and save as many as I can. Scary shi*t but I have it deep
in the back of my mindLast edited by Dingo; 04-16-2008, 06:51 PM.
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